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Abstract: In order to calculate the burden of a comprehensive and progressive income tax 
falling on a certain income source, an apportionment scheme for the entire tax burden has to 
be chosen. This raises the question of how to deal with losses, which is relevant for Germany 
in view of the heavy losses from renting. Using micro data from tax statistics we analyze the 
income tax shares of functional income sources for three apportionment schemes. The choice 
of the apportionment scheme markedly affects the tax shares of income sources and the im-
plicit tax rates, in particular those of capital income.  
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1  Introduction 
The effective tax burden on economic activities plays an important role for many issues of 
fiscal policy. Business and capital income taxation both affect investment, location decisions, 
financing, choices of legal form, and portfolio allocation. Taxes on wages have an impact on 
employment, both as part of the income tax or as payroll taxes financing social security. Due 
to the complexity of real-world taxation systems there is a need for summary measures on the 
tax burden of functional income sources and their share in total tax revenue (Sørensen, 2004: 
1). Such summary measures are of particular interest for the description of tax burden over 
time or across countries. 
Macroeconomic summary measures are constructed for income types by economic functions 
such as labor income, business and capital income, etc.). The European Commission (2009) 
estimates macroeconomic implicit tax rates in the tradition of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar 
(1994) and enhancements of these methods (see OECD, 2001). The calculations are based on 
national accounts data and revenue statistics. They give an impression of the effective tax 
burden in a certain period in the past (“backward-looking”). Besides, the tax burden is mod-
eled for “representative” companies, employees, or private households, in order to demon-
strate potential impacts on different tax rules (“forward-looking”) (see, among others, Deve-
reux et al., 2002, Spengel, 2003, OECD, 2007, Devereux et al., 2008; for the differences be-
tween the approaches see Becker and Fuest, 2006). In this paper, we only discuss a backward-
looking approach which is based on micro data from tax statistics. 
As a starting point for an empirical analysis on the effective tax burden of functional income 
sources one has to allocate total tax revenue across the income sources involved. For instance, 
business and capital income taxes should be assigned to business and capital income, payroll 
and social security taxes to labor income, unless incidence analysis suggests a different distri-
butional impact. This is not straightforward, however, in the case of the personal income tax 
(PIT) which is the highest-yielding revenue source of direct taxation in most OECD countries. 
Actual PIT systems aggregate several income categories to a “comprehensive” tax base, al-
lowing for loss-offset across income types within the assessment year and over time, deduct-
ing several personal allowances and taxing the residuum at progressive tax rates. The tax 
share falling on one income type hence depends on the amount of other taxable income types. 
Therefore, an apportionment scheme has to be chosen in order to calculate the tax burden of 
an income type. This raises the question of how far the estimated tax burden on one income  3
source depends on the choice of the apportionment system. Using representative micro data 
we precisely model different apportionment rules and analyze their impact on tax shares. 
A simple apportionment scheme allocates the total PIT liability across the positive income 
sources according to their share in total positive income. Losses from particular income 
sources are neglected in this case. Many countries use this procedure for limiting tax credits 
against the PIT, e.g. tax credits for taxes from abroad, or for local and regional taxes.1 The 
European Commission (2009) uses a second apportionment scheme. The individual tax liabil-
ity is allocated according to the share of an income source in total income, both positive and 
negative. As long as the tax liability is positive, a negative income tax share is assigned to 
those income types that are running losses.  
We suggest a third apportionment scheme which comprehensively accounts for loss offset. If 
some income sources run losses but others realize positive income we assign the fictitious tax 
liability to the positive income types that would have resulted in taxing them alone. The dif-
ference between the fictitious tax liability on positive incomes and the actual tax liability on 
total income is allocated to the losses as a negative revenue share. If there are losses but total 
income is still positive, due to tax progression the tax shares assigned to both positive and 
negative incomes are higher compared to the apportionment scheme used by the European 
Commission (2009). If the taxpayer’s total income is negative, all the incomes are neglected 
by the second apportionment scheme since there is no tax to pay. In case of the third scheme 
these incomes are taken into account if there is at least one positive income source. 
Thus, the third apportionment scheme puts more weight on losses compared to the second. 
This is a matter of particular interest if some income sources often run losses, which is the 
case for business income and especially for income from renting and leasing. In Germany, the 
latter income source was negative even in aggregate terms for decades. In order to analyze the 
third apportionment scheme we run a separate assessment for total positive income and assign 
the difference between the fictitious PIT liability for the positive incomes and the actual PIT 
liability to the loss income types as a negative revenue share. In analyzing the tax liability 
over time, we also take into account losses carried forward or carried back. 
                                                 
1   In Germany, the local business tax, which plays an important role in business taxation, is credited against 
PIT liability in the case of non incorporated firms.   4
We analyze the impact of the alternative schemes on the tax share of functional income 
sources using representative micro data from tax statistics for all years available over the pe-
riod from 1992 to 2003. Moreover, in order to point out the impact on macroeconomic im-
plicit tax rates we calculate them following the approach of the European Commission (2009). 
The use of micro data from tax statistics instead of macro data from revenue statistics or na-
tional accounts allows for an apportionment of profit taxation to sole proprietors and partner-
ships. Therefore, for the first time for Germany we are able to allocate the overall tax burden 
on business income to private households (including the sole proprietors) and corporations 
(including partnerships) according to the concept of national accounts.  
As a main result, we find that the choice of the apportionment scheme markedly affects the 
tax share attributed to the income sources. Income types without significant losses such as 
labor income or transfer incomes show higher tax shares and implicit tax rates if we account 
for losses. The opposite is true for capital income, in particular for income from renting and 
leasing, since losses from these incomes have been dominating during the last decades in 
Germany. 
The following Section 2 portrays the three alternative apportionment schemes and illustrates 
their effects by an example close to reality. Section 3 further specifies the alternatives. Section 
4 describes the empirical analysis based on micro data from tax statistics as well as national 
account data. Section 5 presents the results with respect to the income tax shares and implicit 
tax rates by functional income sources. Section 6 concludes.  
2  Alternative Apportionment Schemes for the Personal Income Tax 
In order to allocate the tax revenue raised by a comprehensive and progressive personal in-
come tax (PIT) including loss offset across the income sources involved, an apportionment 
scheme for the entire tax burden has to be chosen. The selected formula should be convenient 
for the analysis intended, and the assumptions should be made clear. This study scrutinizes 
the impact of different apportionment schemes on the income tax shares and implicit tax rates 
of functional income sources and points out the consequences of the underlying assumptions.  
A simple approach is to allocate the total PIT liability across the positive income sources ac-
cording to their share in total positive income. The German income tax law applies this pro- 5
cedure in crediting foreign taxes (Sec. 34c German Income Tax Code) or parts of the local 
business tax (Sec. 35 German Income Tax Code) against PIT.2 Losses from particular income 
sources are neglected in this case although they reduce taxable income and thus the PIT liabil-
ity. The latter is allocated to positive incomes only. 
An alternative is splitting up PIT by both positive and negative income sources according to 
their share in total income, aggregated over all incomes and allowing for loss offset. The 
European Commission employs this apportionment scheme for the calculation of implicit tax 
rates for functional income sources (European Commission, 2009, De Laet and Wöhlbier, 
2008).3 From an economic point of view, taking into account losses in allocating PIT burden 
across income sources could be motivated by fundamental characteristics of income streams. 
Investment choices and many other economic decisions often have an impact over many 
years. Therefore the resulting income streams should be appraised for longer time periods. 
This is particular the case for business income, for which losses often have to be balanced by 
profits in later years. Another issue of German income taxation is that taxable income from 
renting and leasing is negative even in aggregate (see Table A-1 in the Appendix). Tax policy 
obviously aims to promote housing and real estate investments by hidden tax subsidies in the 
guise of income determination rules. An allocation rule that only refers to positive income 
sources raised in the particular assessment year neglects the dampening effect of loss offset 
allowances, both within the assessment year and over time. Thus, income tax shares of 
stronger loss-making income sources such as business and rental income are overestimated, 
the shares of labor or transfer income are underestimated respectively. The apportionment 
scheme based on yearly positive and negative income sources can not fully account for long-
term impacts of taxation over the life-cycle, in particular with respect to individuals that are 
only running losses over a long time. However, accounting for current losses and also consid-
ering losses carried forward or carried back might capture the essential elements of intertem-
poral income allocation. 
                                                 
2  In a similar way, the means testing of social transfers in Germany such as the housing allowance or public 
student loans only refers to positive income sources.  
3   For Germany, these calculations were realized using comprehensive microsimulation models commissioned 
by the Federal Ministry of Finance. Presumably, current losses of single income sources were taken into ac-
count for the apportionment (see European Commission, 2009: 371). It remains unclear, however, if, and in 
which way, intertemporal loss carry-forward or carry-back have also been taken into account.   6
The following example points out these impacts for a taxpayer over three assessment years, 
whereas the time value of money is ignored and a simple tax schedule is assumed. In every 
year the taxpayer earns wages of Euro 70,000. In the first and second year he is running losses 
from a real estate investment, in the third year he sells this investment with a considerable 
capital gain which is liable to PIT. To sum up, the total income over the three years amounts 
to Euro 210,000 from wages, and 20,000 from renting.  
Example 
Income sources, taxable income and personal income tax liability over three years 
in Euro 
123
Assumptions tax base and tax rate
Income from
wages and salaries  70 000   70 000   70 000   210 000  91.3 
renting and leasing - 100 000  - 20 000   140 000   20 000  8.7 
Total income - 30 000   50 000   210 000   230 000  100.0 
Total positive income sources  70 000   70 000   210 000   350 000  152.2 
Deduction of loss carry-forward   0  - 30 000    0  - 30 000 
Adjusted gross income - 30 000   20 000   210 000   200 000 
Personal allowances  15 000   15 000   15 000   45 000 
Taxable income   0   5 000   195 000   200 000 
PIT liability, 25% flat rate   0   1 250   48 750   50 000 
(1) Allocation of PIT liability across positive income sources
Income from
wages and salaries   0   1 250   16 250   17 500  35.0 
renting and leasing   0    0   32 500   32 500  65.0 
Total   0   1 250   48 750   50 000  100.0 
(2) Allocation of PIT liability across all income sources including deducted losses
Income from
wages and salaries   0   4 375   16 250   20 625  41.3 
renting and leasing   0  - 3 125   32 500   29 375  58.8 
Total   0   1 250   48 750   50 000  100.0 
(3) Allocation of PIT liability with separate assessment of positive and negative income sources
Income from
wages and salaries  13 750   13 750   16 250   43 750  87.5 
renting and leasing - 13 750  - 12 500   32 500   6 250  12.5 
Total   0   1 250   48 750   50 000  100.0 
For information: Effective tax rate 
of income from
wages  and  salaries 19.6 19.6 23.2 20.8 
renting  and  leasing 13.8 25.0 23.2 31.3 
Year
Total
Total      
in percent
 
In order to determine the tax liability we assume a simple tax law. There is a loss carry-
forward rule, no loss carry-back, personal allowances of Euro 15,000 per year are deducted  7
from taxable income, there is a flat-rate tax of 25 percent, and there are no specific arrange-
ments for family taxation or capital gains taxation. According to the example, no tax liability 
is due in the first year. Non-deducted losses could be carried forward to the following year. 
The total income tax liability over the period sums to Euro 50,000.  
If we allocate the yearly income tax liability only across positive income types (alternative 1 
in the example) we ignore the losses from renting set off against labor income in splitting up 
PIT. In contrast, the considerable capital gain from renting in the third year is fully included 
in the apportionment. Therefore, the first allocation rule results in a 35 percent tax share of 
renting income. In contrast, the share for income from renting in total income over the three 
years amounts to only 8.7 percent. 
The example’s second alternative allocates the PIT liability according to both positive and 
negative income sources, thereby allowing for loss offset. Since the losses carried forward 
from the first year result from renting, the corresponding loss deduction in the second year is 
assigned to this income source. Thus, the share of renting income in total PIT liability over 
the three years declines to 59 percent. Yet this share is still much too high since the second 
apportionment scheme does not account for the positive labor income in the first year which 
is completely offset against losses from renting. 
We suggest a third apportionment scheme which fully accounts for loss offset, even in the 
case if there is no positive taxable income, like in the first year of our example. This alterna-
tive shows how much PIT revenue would have been raised if positive income sources were 
taxed alone without loss offset as well as the negative revenue impact of losses. For that pur-
pose we run an additional assessment for each year that only accounts for positive income 
sources. The higher fictitious tax liability is allocated to positive income sources only. After-
wards, the difference between this fictitious tax liability on positive incomes and the actual 
tax liability on total income is allocated to the loss-making income sources as a negative 
revenue share. Over the three years, the tax share of the income sources nearly equals the 
income share. The remaining overestimation of the tax share falling on renting income results 
from the indirect tax progression that is caused by the personal allowances. These allowances 
are not included in the intertemporal loss offset. This impact would be enhanced by direct tax 
progression from increasing tax rates, which is still applied in most OECD countries.   8
3  Modeling the Apportionment Schemes 
The empirical assessment of the PIT apportionment across different income types requires an 
adequate data base. In principle, macro data, semi-aggregated data or micro data could be 
used. As the advantages of micro data the European Commission emphasizes a precise esti-
mation of the share of each income type in total taxes and of the average tax rate (European 
Commission, 2009: 367, 375, see also Sørensen, 2004: 21, Clark, 2002). 
In order to capture the impact of specific tax regulations for certain income types, the calcula-
tion of the PIT shares should be based on representative micro data from tax files. This allows 
a realistic allocation of taxes across income types for each taxpayer. In comparison, estimates 
based on statistics of cash revenue of the tax authorities do not necessarily provide a proper 
assignment of the income tax burden to the accrual period (BMF, 2004). Due to current in-
terim payments, which are based on previous tax assessments, supplementary payments, or 
repayments for previous tax years, these estimates may differ substantially from the assessed 
tax liability in a certain year. Moreover, the reported aggregate tax revenue data may not be 
allocated properly by income sources since the underlying prepayment or repayment proce-
dures encompass several income types. However, revenue statistics in Germany are available 
up to the present while micro data from income tax statistics are published with a consider-
able delay. At present, the latest complete wave is for the year 2004. 
For couples which are assessed jointly in Germany or in case of further household members 
included in the assessment, the income sources should be treated separately by individuals, 
provided that the information is available. For the apportionment scheme proposed in this 
study (alternative 3), an additional tax assessment has to be made taking into account only 
positive incomes. This requires a microsimulation model which provides an estimate of the 
tax liability for each taxpayer close to reality. The PIT shares of the different income types on 
the individual level may then be added up in order to determine the respective shares on the 
aggregate level. 
Naturally, the regulations of the German income tax system are more complex than the rules 
described in the example above. For instance, there are specific tax allowances and tax deduc-
tions for some income types. Moreover, as in many other countries, the tax rate is directly 
progressive which means that the marginal tax liability increases with taxable income.  9
The characteristics of the German income tax function PIT which are relevant for this study 
can be described for taxpayer j with income types i as follows (see also European Commis-
sion, 2009: 375, Clark, 2002): 
,, , () ,
pp
ji j i j j j i j j
ii
PIT t Y A L A C C

     
   (1) 
where the following notation applies:  
t(. )   denotes the tax rate function with taxable income as argument. This function is “linear-
progressive” in Germany which means that the marginal tax rate increases with taxable 
income until the maximum income tax rate is reached (2009: 42 percent starting from a 
taxable income of Euro 52,552, and 45 percent from Euro 250,401 onwards). 
Yi   represents the single income type i, such as business income and its sub-categories (in 
Germany: agriculture and forestry, unincorporated business enterprise, and other self-
employed activities), labor income, capital income (from capital investments and from 
renting and leasing), transfer income. Each type of income is included after the deduction 
of operating expenses or other income-related expenses. 
Ai   measures income type specific allowances like the saver’s allowance for income from 
capital investments, or the allowance for income from agriculture and forestry. 
L   denotes deducted losses that are carried forward from previous tax years or carried back 
from following tax years. 
A
p   represents personal deductions and allowances like the tax allowance for elderly persons, 
the allowance for itemized special expenses and extraordinary expenses, or the child- or 
household allowances.  
Ci   measures income type specific credits that are deducted from the tax liability as, for in-
stance, the foreign tax credit, the credit for local business tax (since 2001) or the tax 
credit for domestic corporate income tax (until 2001). 
C
p  denotes credits from the tax liability which are not related to specific income types, for 
example donations for political parties, or expenses for household-related services 
(among others: expenses for house-cleaning). 
Alternative 1 
In the first PIT apportionment scheme considered, the total PIT liability is distributed by the 
share of positive income for each income type in total positive income. The income tax bur-
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 (2) 
Thus, the PIT liability is allocated according to the level of the positive incomes for each in-
come source, as far as the earnings exceed the income-specific tax deductions. First, all in- 10
come-specific tax credits are added on top of the tax liability that should be allocated among 
the income types. In a second step, the PIT share attributed to an income type will be reduced 
by the tax credits granted for this specific income type. Tax credits from the tax liability that 
do not refer to specific income types (C
p) will not be considered in the apportionment. Thus, 
they reduce the tax burden of all income types proportionally to their share in total positive 
income. 
Alternative 2 
The second alternative of an apportionment scheme takes into account both positive and nega-
tive income types. For that purpose, one should not only consider current positive and nega-
tive income sources but also deducted losses in the tax year (L), which are carried forward 
from previous tax years or carried back from following tax years. If adequate panel data were 
available, one could assign the impact of the losses from other periods to each income type, as 
it is the case for income from renting in the example above (section 2). However, the only 
data available for Germany for the past are the cross-section surveys of the income tax statis-
tic which were drawn every three years. The waves are not connected and do not provide 
panel information. Panel information might be available in the future and will be based on the 
yearly survey of the assessment data that starts with the year 2001. At present, the available 
cross-section data only allow to take into account the aggregate of losses deducted. We define 
an additional negative income type L which comprises deducted losses from other periods and 
will be considered in the allocation of the income tax across income types. 
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 (3b) 
While the information from the cross-section micro data of the income tax statistic does not 
allow a precise allocation of deducted losses across income types, it can be used as a basis for 
a rough estimate. For the past the cross section data show the amount of current unclaimed 
losses, i.e. losses which cannot be set off against current positive income in the tax year. The  11
latest available wave of the income tax statistics 2004 reports a share of unclaimed losses in 
total losses for income from renting of 24 percent and a share for business income of 64 per-
cent, the other income types are not important. Note, however, that the share of unclaimed 
losses for income from renting was somewhat higher in the years before 2004, and it was 
considerably higher in the nineties (1995: 39 %, 1998: 37 %). We use rough estimates based 
on this information in the calculations presented below in order to allocate the tax share of 
unclaimed losses PITL across the income types i for the calculation of implicit tax rates (sec-
tion 5.2). 
Alternative 3 
Alternative 3 differs from alternative 2 if a person has positive income for some income types 
and losses for at least one other income type. For persons with positive income types only, the 
share of each income type is identical to the result in alternative 2. Thus, differences emerge 
only for persons with positive and negative income types. As demonstrated in the example in 
section 2, an additional tax assessment of positive incomes only and assigning the negative 
PIT share to losses might lead to results for the PIT shares which are close to those based on a 
proper analysis over time. 
At fist, the additional tax assessment takes into account only positive income types. The ficti-
tious tax liability on positive income types of person j, PITj
+ is formally defined as: 
,, , max( ,0) .
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 (5) 
Then, the difference between the actual income tax PITj and the fictitious higher tax on posi-
tive income PITj
+ is distributed among the negative income types. The tax burden for a nega-
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 (6a)  12
Analogous to equation 3b, the negative income tax burden PITL,j
- which falls on loss carry-
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 (6b) 
If the tax credits Ci und C
p themselves depend on the level of taxable income or on the level of 
the income tax liability, the effects of these dependencies could in principle be captured in the 
equations (5), (6a), and (6b). For example, the old-age allowance depends on the level of la-
bor income and other incomes except specific old-age incomes (pensions or annuities). The 
credit of foreign taxes or of the local business tax depends on the share of these income types 
in total taxable income and on the level of the PIT liability. 
In case of a progressive tax, there are two main differences between alternative 2 and alterna-
tive 3 (see the example in the appendix). First, the distributed tax liability is equal to zero both 
for positive and negative income types under alternative 2 if total income (adjusted gross in-
come) is below zero and, thus, no taxes are paid in the current tax year. This differs from al-
ternative 3 and this difference can be most easily described for the simple case of one positive 
and one negative income type. In this case, under alternative 3 the positive income type is 
assigned a tax amount which depends on the level of the positive income type alone. If the 
sum of both incomes is below zero, the negative income type is assigned the level of the (fic-
titious) tax on the positive income type, with the opposite sign. 
The second difference occurs if total income is positive and a PIT liability exists but at least 
one income type is negative. In alternative 2, the amount of losses is valued with the average 
tax rate and this rate is taken at the level of total income (adjusted gross income). Under alter-
native 3, taxes assigned to the loss income type are equal to the difference between the tax 
liability considering only the positive income types and the tax which falls on total income 
(adjusted gross income). Approximately, this is equal to a valuation of the losses with the 
marginal tax rate (for the interval between total income and total positive income). As for a 
progressive tax scheme the marginal tax rate is higher than the average tax rate, losses are 
valued higher under alternative 3.  
It can be shown that alternative 2 and 3 lead to equal results for a pure flat tax with tax rate α 
if no allowances are granted and taxes are refunded in case of negative taxable income: 
,, () .
flat
ji j i j
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PIT Y A       (7)  13
This is, for instance, the case with the European value-added tax (VAT). However, income 
tax systems in Germany and other OECD countries are far from fulfilling these conditions. 
The income tax is assessed on an annual basis. Unclaimed losses may only be carried back or 
carried forward in other tax years and offset against positive income, without any considera-
tion of personal allowances. Approaches aiming to equalize the average tax rate over a longer 
time-period (Vickrey, 1939, Hackmann, 1979) cannot be found in real tax rules. This disad-
vantages persons with highly volatile income compared to those with a steady income stream. 
Thus, alternative 3, or the differences in the results of alternatives 2 and 3 respectively, pro-
vide important additional information on the income tax share and implicit tax rates of income 
sources when losses play an important role for some income types. This was the case in Ger-
many in the eighties and the nineties of the last century, especially for rental income (see Ta-
ble A-1 in the appendix). The share of the income tax burden as well as the implicit tax rate 
for these income types are considerably lower under alternative 3 while the opposite applies 
for the other income types (see the results presented in section 5).  
4  Empirical Strategy for Germany 
4.1  Apportionment Schemes for the Personal Income Tax 
The effects of alternatives 1 and 2 can be analyzed empirically by using representative micro 
data of the German income tax statistics. Until 2001, the income tax statistics were collected 
in triennial intervals, including additional data from the wage withholding taxation. Since 
2001, a yearly survey of the assessment data is also available. Our analysis is based on highly 
representative 10 percent stratified random samples from the personal income tax statistics of 
the particular years.4 The data sets include nearly all items of the tax return forms which are 
stored electronically by the fiscal authorities. Due to the long-lasting assessment procedures, 
the latest available wave of the income tax statistics is for the year 2004. Based on this de-
tailed information we consider all income-specific allowances and tax credits in allocating the 
PIT liability across income types. The analysis of alternative 3, however, requires an addi-
                                                 
4   A higher sampling fraction is provided for taxpayers with higher income and other tax-relevant characteris-
tics in order to minimize the standard error with respect to taxable income.  14
tional PIT assessment that only accounts for positive income sources. We are using compre-
hensive microsimulation models to determine the higher fictitious PIT liability.  
As income-specific allowances (Ai) we take into account the allowance for income from agri-
culture and forestry (Sec. 13 sub. 3 German Income Tax Code) and the saver’s allowance 
(Sec. 20 sub. 4 German Income Tax Code). As income-specific tax credits (Ci) we consider 
the former top tax rate limitation for income from unincorporated business enterprise (Sec. 
32c, until 2000), the credit for local business tax (Sec. 35, since 2001), and the credit for in-
come from agriculture and forestry (Sec. 34e, until 2000). For income from capital invest-
ment, we account for the domestic corporate income tax that could be credited against PIT 
under the full imputation system in Germany until 2001. Due to lack of information and their 
minor quantitative importance, we neglect foreign tax credits in the apportionment analysis.5 
We also neglect the reduced tax rates for capital gains from sale of an enterprise, or parts of 
an enterprise (which apply if the entrepreneur retires or becomes disabled, Sec. 34 sub. 3 
German Income Tax Code), that could be regarded as a type of tax credit. One should assign 
this tax reduction to business income. However, this would require extensive calculations in 
order to isolate the dampening impact on the tax liability. With respect to the minor impact on 
PIT revenue we neglect this provision for the split-up across income types. 
For the PIT apportionment, the taxation with progression procedure (“Progressionsvorbehalt”) 
could be treated in different ways. According to this peculiar tradition of the German income 
taxation system, certain tax-exempted incomes (in particular exempted foreign income and 
wage replacement benefits from social security) are taken into account in calculating the aver-
age tax rate, which is then applied to taxable income only. We simply allocate this tax en-
hancing effect to the sources of taxable income according the respective apportionment 
scheme under consideration. Alternatively, one could regard this tax increase as a burden on 
the exempted income sources.  
For joint-filing married couples we implement the PIT apportionment using the income in-
formation for each spouse which is separately reported in the data set. If, for instance, the 
                                                 
5   The income tax files include only summarized information on foreign taxes that are allowed to credit against 
German PIT liability. There is no information available from which particular income types the foreign tax 
credit stems. Presumably, capital investments dominate the underlying incomes, and these incomes are usu-
ally taxed in the investor’s country of residence including foreign tax credit according to the double taxation 
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husband is running losses from renting of Euro 20,000, and his wife earns Euro 10,000 from 
renting, the wife’s positive income would account for the split-up according to alternative 1. 
If we regarded the couple as a single taxpayer, however, there would be losses from renting of 
Euro 10,000. In the case of alternative 3, the wife’s positive income from renting were con-
sidered in allocating the higher fictitious tax liability allocated to positive income sources 
only, and the husband’s losses were included in the apportionment of the negative revenue 
shares of loss income sources. 
In addition to the analysis based on the tax return data from the income tax statistics of the 
respective years, we have to estimate the missing revenue from the numerous non-filing tax-
payers only paying wage tax at the source. Until 2004, these tax returns are only partially 
included in the German income tax statistics since there was no reliable system to collect the 
wage tax cards that are not returned to the fiscal authorities. Results for 2004, the first year in 
which the electronic data transfer of the employers’ wage-tax returns has been utilized by the 
tax statistics, reveal about 6 million non-filing wage taxpayers and an extra wage tax revenue 
of Euro 14.5 billion including solidarity surcharge tax. For the previous years, we estimate 
this missing revenue in comparing the entire wage tax revenue from the current revenue sta-
tistics with the aggregated wage tax of the filing taxpayers credited against income tax liabil-
ity and thus reported in the income tax statistics. We assign the missing wage tax revenue to 
labor income. 
The empirical analysis of alternative 3 is more intricate compared to the other apportionment 
alternatives. For an additional PIT assessment of the positive income sources we use compre-
hensive microsimulation models that fully account for nearly all of the relevant items of ap-
plicable tax law in the respective years. For the years 1995 and 1998 we use our own mi-
crosimulation model (Bach et al., 2004). For the years 2002 onwards we use the personal in-
come tax microsimulation model of the Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Information Tech-
nology FIT, Sankt Augustin, which is operated on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of 
Finance in order to evaluate the fiscal and distributional impact of tax reforms. 
The models are based on income tax samples for the corresponding years. The FIT personal 
income tax model is based on the 2003 wave of the assessed income tax statistics. Taxpayers, 
                                                                                                                                                          
provisions. In some cases business or labor income might also be affected, but usually these foreign incomes 
are exempted from domestic PIT in Germany.  16
taxable and non-taxable income sources, and the other tax-relevant items are extrapolated to 
2007 (for a description of the methods used see Quinke, 2001, Bach et al., 2004). Changes in 
tax law including the recent reforms are captured in the simulation code. Based on this model 
we are running simulations on the PIT liability for 2007. 
The simulation models allow us realistic assessments of the additional PIT liability for the 
positive income sources according to alternative 3. For the calculation of total income and the 
subsequent determination of the PIT liability we nullify all of the negative income sources as 
well as the deduction of losses carried forward and back. In the case of joint-filing married 
couples, the apportionment scheme is performed with the detailed income information for 
each spouse, including the allocation of positive and negative PIT revenue shares according to 
alternative 3. Behavioral responses of the taxpayers to the higher tax burden are not consid-
ered.  
4.2  Data Demands for the Calculation of Implicit Tax Rates 
In order to highlight the impact of the different apportionment schemes on macroeconomic 
implicit tax rates we calculate these figures following the approach of the European Commis-
sion (2009). Implicit tax rates are defined as the ratio of the tax burden assigned to the respec-
tive income types and the corresponding income aggregates that are derived from the national 
accounts statistics. The implicit tax rates are calculated for labor income and for capital and 
business income, the latter differentiated by corporations and households including the self-
employed. The European Commission (2009) reports such implicit tax rates for every year 
since 1995.6  
In line with the concept of the European Commission (2009), we adopt the “usual” assump-
tions regarding tax incidence, in particular, that the employers’ share of social contributions is 
borne by labor income, and that the corporate income tax and other business taxes fall on 
                                                 
6    The yearly calculation of macroeconomic implicit tax rates according to the approach of the European 
Commission (2009) raises a problem with respect to the timely accounting of losses carried forward or back 
(Clark, 2002: 15, see also Jacob et al., 2008: 11, 19). Current unclaimed losses actually reduce the income 
aggregate of the year when they arise. In contrast, the tax liability is reduced in the following or previous tax 
years when the losses are deducted from the tax base. In single years, this timing problem might have a sig-
nificant impact on the implicit tax rates, in particular if there is a trend in losses, or gains and losses system-
atically vary over the business cycle. This problem might be of some importance for Germany because un-
claimed losses carried forward strongly increased over the last decades (Dwenger, 2008). We abstain from 
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business and capital income. This means that these taxes are not shifted forward to consumers 
or backwards to employees or suppliers.7 The main task of studies such as European Commis-
sion (2009) and our contribution presented here is to provide empirical information on tax 
revenue and macroeconomic tax bases. Based on this approach, different incidence assump-
tions across income sources could also be analyzed. 
For calculating the implicit tax rate on labor income the European Commission includes the 
social contributions levied on labor income (European Commission, 2009: 354), in addition to 
the wage share in PIT liability. The revenue of social contributions is taken from the national 
accounts statistics (compulsory actual social contributions paid by employers and employees 
on employed labor income). The total tax burden on labor is put in relation to the compensa-
tion of employees according to national accounts. This is the broadest macroeconomic labor 
income aggregate, comprising all salaries and wages from dependent employment, including 
the remuneration of civil servants, wages from short-time employment taxed in a lump sum 
(the so called “minijobs” in Germany), other compensations from dependent employment 
exempted from PIT or social contributions, and the employers’ social contributions. 
Our calculations on the implicit tax rates on capital and business income differ in some re-
spects from the approach of the European Commission (2009). For the yearly tax burden of 
the local business tax and the corporate income tax, the Commission uses data from the cur-
rent revenue statistics. In contrast, we are using the actual annual tax liability for these taxes, 
as it is reported in the corresponding tax statistics (see also Bach und Dwenger, 2007). This 
gives a more reliable picture of the yearly implicit tax rate, since the cash revenue disclosed in 
the revenue statistics for a given year might considerably differ from the actual tax liability 
for that year. These business taxes heavily rely on business profits, which is also true for the 
local business tax. Thus, current interim payments which are based on previous tax assess-
ments as well as supplementary payments or repayments after the assessment for previous tax 
years might considerably abandon the year’s actual tax liability according to the tax assess-
                                                                                                                                                          
adjusting for these unclaimed losses, and thus remain in line with the modelling of the European Commis-
sion (2009). 
7   These assumptions have been questioned for several decades. With respect to the first, this might not be true 
in the short run since the employer has to pay the contribution from his payroll in accordance with the appli-
cable tax law. Adjustments in wage setting etc. take some time. In the case of the latter, recent studies indi-
cate that labor might bear a substantial burden from the corporate income tax (Gentry, 2007). This seems 
plausible against the background of globalization, market income polarization, as well as the European tax 
reduction competition.  18
ment, and these timing differences might heavily fluctuate with the business cycle or after 
major tax reforms.  
As measure of the corporate income tax burden we use the assessed tax liability including 
solidarity surcharge and after deduction of domestic corporate income tax (until 2001 Ger-
many applied the full imputation system to avoid double taxation of distributed profits). For 
2007, we use the estimates of our microsimulation model on business taxation BizTax for 
Germany (Bach et al., 2008). This model is based on representative micro data form the last 
available waves of the German business tax statistics, the model data set is uprated to the pre-
sent using the pertinent macro data and forecasts. Recent tax reforms are implemented in the 
tax assessment program code. Moreover, we estimate the withholding taxes on capital in-
vestments which are not credited against domestic personal or corporate income tax, thus paid 
by foreigners or tax exempted residents. For that purpose, we compare the cash revenue from 
these taxes with the credits for these taxes reported in the personal and corporate income tax 
statistics for the particular years.  
The European Commission assigns the social contributions levied on the income of the self-
employed to capital and business income. In Germany, some self-employed members of pro-
fessional guilds such as craftsmen, farmers, artists, or writers are compulsorily insured in the 
public pension system. Moreover, other self-employed persons are voluntarily insured in the 
public pension system or in the public health insurance. We take these figures from the na-
tional accounts, according to the method of the European Commission (2009: 348).  
The European Commission proposes a specific income concept for the denominator of the 
implicit tax rate on capital and business income (European Commission, 2009: 360) that is 
derived from the income accounts of the national accounts statistics. The idea is to approxi-
mate the actual tax base as close as possible. We modify this approach with respect to three 
items. First, we take into account the specific treatment of the local business tax revenue in 
the German national accounts. Although the German local business tax nowadays is largely 
levied on business profits, its revenue is not booked into the category “taxes on income” of 
the secondary distribution of income account (ESA 95 Code: d51). Instead, it is factored into 
the position “other taxes on production” in the generation of income account (ESA 95 Code: 
d29). This comes from the historical tradition of the local business tax which was formerly 
levied on a broader base of the firm’s value added and equity. German statistical authorities 
are currently reconsidering this assignment. The revenue of “other taxes on production” is 
deducted in calculating primary incomes in national accounts. Since local business tax reve- 19
nue should be included in the numerator of the implicit tax rate, it should not reduce the de-
nominator, as it is the case in the Commission’s calculations. Therefore, we increase the de-
nominator as defined by the European Commission by the local business tax revenue. Second, 
we reduce capital and business income by the non-taxable subsidies which are roughly esti-
mated by 20 percent of the category “production subsidies other than on products” (ESA 95 
Code: d39rec) (see Bach und Dwenger, 2007: 62), and the profit income of the central reserve 
bank. The Tables 3 to 5 in the following section 5 both include the capital and business in-
come aggregates according to our concept and of the European Commission.  
The comprehensive utilization of tax statistics data allows us, for the first time for Germany, 
to differentiate the implicit tax rate on capital and business income in those of corporations 
and households including the self-employed according to the concept of the European Com-
mission. The reports of the European Commission (2009) do not provide these figures for 
Germany since the revenue statistics used in that study do not allow an apportionment to these 
subgroups of taxpayers. The problem is to isolate the share of non-incorporated partnerships 
in tax revenue. Partnerships play an important role in Germany as many medium-sized busi-
nesses and even some bigger firms use this legal form. The income of partnerships is taxed 
“transparently” which means that the entire business income is passed to the shareholders 
who have to enter it into their PIT return. In national accounts, however, partnerships are as-
signed to the corporate sector, and German national accounts statistics follow this approach 
according to European and international standards. The revenue statistics do not distinguish 
between those company sectors, but the tax statistics do. The local business tax statistics in-
clude the legal form of the firms, which we use. The income tax statistics differentiate busi-
ness income (from agriculture and forestry, from business enterprise, and from professional 
services) into income from sole proprietorship and from partnerships. Based on this informa-
tion, we further allocate the PIT share on business income across sole proprietors and partner-
ships using the alternative 2 as apportionment scheme. The share of sole proprietors is as-
signed to the household sector, the share of partnerships is assigned to corporations. The so-
cial contributions of the self-employed are allocated to the household sector.  
For the denominator of the implicit tax rate we calculate the two sectors’ macroeconomic 
income aggregates according to the concept of the European Commission (2009: 362), using  20
the sectoral income accounts of the national accounts data.8 The addition of the local business 
tax revenue as well as the deductions for non-taxable subsidies and profit income of the cen-
tral reserve bank (see above) follow the respective information of the sectoral accounts.  
5  Results 
5.1  Personal Income Tax Shares 
The results of the three PIT apportionment alternatives considered in this study are presented 
in Table 1 for the years 1992, 1995, 1998, 2003, and 2007. For 1992, the alternative 3 of the 
PIT split-up has not been analyzed because we do not have a microsimulation model for this 
year. The starting point of the apportionment procedure is the entire PIT liability per year 
including the non-assessed wage tax revenue and the solidarity surcharge. Until 2001, we 
deduct the domestic corporate income tax credited against PIT, according to the full imputa-
tion system applied until then in Germany. The PIT is the tax with the highest revenue in 
Germany. For instance, in 2003 the entire revenue of PIT including non-assessed wage tax 
and solidarity surcharge amounts to Euro 198 billion, or 9.2 percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP). This revenue rises to 9.4 percent of GDP in 2007 according to our estimations 
based FIT personal income tax model. The model’s data base for 2007 is aligned to the per-
formance of the macroeconomic income aggregates and the cash revenue of the PIT compo-
nents. 
The categories of the income types considered in Table 1 follow the concept of the European 
Commission (2009). While most of the definitions of income types are obvious, some deserve 
a comment. Labor income only includes compensations for active dependent employment. 
Pensions and related benefits from former employment, in particular the remuneration of re-
tired civil servants, are assigned to transfer income. Self-employed income comprises the 
income from all unincorporated business, inclusive agriculture and forestry and from profes-
sional services. These income sources comprehend the entire profit from business enterprise. 
                                                 
8   According to the concept of the European Commission (2009: 363) the capital and business income aggre-
gates assigned to the two sectors do not sum up to the overall aggregate. Due to the double taxation of divi-
dends at the company level and at the shareholder level, the Commission includes the dividend income re-
ceived by private households (ESA 95 Code: d42_S14-15rec) in both the corporations’ and the households’ 
denominator.  21
There is no fictitious allocation across imputed entrepreneurial wage, return on business capi-
tal, and extra profits. Income from renting and leasing, from capital investment, and capital 
gains are consolidated to capital income. The remaining income types liable to PIT such as 
the taxable share of public pensions or alimonies between separated or divorced spouses are 
assigned to transfer income. For the apportionment alternatives 2 and 3 we consider deducted 
losses that were carried forward or carried back from previous or following tax years as a 
specific negative income type, as described above (see above, section 4.2). Further analysis of 
the available waves of the income tax statistics shows that more than two thirds of the un-
claimed losses generated in 2002 to 2004 stem from self-employed income, the rest refers to 
losses from renting. In the nineties, the share of renting income was somewhat higher. For the 
calculation of implicit tax rates (see the following section 5.2) we assign the negative revenue 
impact of deducted losses from previous or following tax years to capital and business in-
come, since labor income or other income types have practically no impact on unclaimed 
losses carried forward or back.  
As expected, the PIT apportionment according to positive income types only (alternative 1) 
yields relatively low shares for income types that do not have significant losses such as labor 
income or transfer income (Table 1). Their share in the PIT is higher in alternatives 2 and 3. 
Taxable income from renting and leasing was heavily generating losses during the nineties. 
This causes lower PIT shares of capital income and especially of renting income for alterna-
tives 2 and 3 compared to alternative 1.  
We find some variation over time for all income types. The share of self-employed income 
decreases from 1992 to 1995 as well as from 1998 to 2003. Besides business cycle fluctua-
tions, the introduction of the top tax rate limitation for income from business enterprise in 
1993 and the credit for local business tax as of 2001 might have had an impact on this devel-
opment. According to the estimation for 2007 the self-employed income’s share rises mark-
edly. This reflects the profit boost in the years before, which is taken into account for the pro-
jection of the model’s data base. Correspondingly, labor’s share in PIT revenue varies in the 
opposite direction.   22
Table 1 
Allocation of PIT revenue by income sources according to different apportionment schemes, 
1992–2007 
1992 1995 1998 2003 2007
1)
Personal income tax, wage tax
2)  147 927   154 177   180 688   189 144   216 154 
Solidarity surcharge  5 659   10 675   8 974   9 064   10 506 
Total  153 586   164 852   189 661   198 208   226 660 
Total 9.3 8.9 9.7 9.2 9.4 
Alternative 1
Allocation across positive income sources
3) from
Labor income
4) 72.9 76.6 73.6 76.2 69.2 
Self-employed income 20.7 17.6 21.0 16.7 23.5 
Sole proprietors 13.5 10.5 11.9 10.8 15.3 
Partnerships 7.2 7.1 9.1 5.9 8.2 
Capital income 3.7 2.7 2.7 4.1 4.0 
Capital investment
5) 1.9 0.7 0.8 2.0 2.1 
Renting and leasing 1.8 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.9 
Transfer income
6) 2.7 3.1 2.7 3.0 3.3 
Deducted losses from other tax years 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Alternative 2
Allocation across all income sources including 
deducted losses from
Labor income
4) 74.5 78.8 75.7 77.9 70.3 
Self-employed income 21.4 18.7 21.9 16.9 24.2 
Sole proprietors 14.0 11.2 12.4 10.8 15.5 
Partnerships 7.4 7.6 9.5 6.1 8.7 
Capital income 1.5 -0.4 -0.1  2.4  2.7 
Capital investment
5) 2.2 1.1 1.2 2.2 2.2 
Renting and leasing -0.7 -1.4 -1.2  0.2  0.5 
Transfer income
6) 2.8 3.1 2.7 3.0 3.4 
Deducted losses from other tax years -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Alternative 3
Allocation with separate assessment of positive 
and negative income sources
3) from
Labor income
4) 81.6 78.4 79.8 71.5 
Self-employed income 20.1 22.9 17.0 24.3 
Sole proprietors 12.0 13.0 10.9 15.5 
Partnerships 8.1 9.9 6.1 8.7 
Capital income -3.7  -3.1 1.2 1.9 
Capital investment
5) 1.7 1.7 2.4 2.3 
Renting and leasing -5.4 -4.8 -1.2 -0.5 
Transfer income
6) 3.4 3.0 3.3 3.5 
Deducted losses from other tax years -1.3 -1.2 -1.3 -1.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Structure in % by income types
Annual revenue, mill. Euro
as % of GDP
1) Estimation.- 2) Assessed personal income tax, non-assessed wage tax, less credited domestic corporate income 
tax.- 3) For joint-filing married couples the income sources of each spouse are counted seperately.- 4) Compen-
sations for active dependent employment, excluding pensions and related benefits from former employment.- 5) In-
cluding capital gains.- 6) Other income liable to PIT less capital gains, including pensions and related benefits from 
former employment.
Sources: Personal income tax statistics, 10 % or 1 % stratified random samples of the respective years; PIT 
microsimulation models of DIW Berlin and FIT Sankt Augustin; Federal Statistical Office Germany (Destatis). 
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If we compare the results for alternative 2 which is used by the European Commission with 
those for alternative 3 suggested by us, we find that the labor income share in PIT for alterna-
tive 3 is higher by various percentage points. In 1995 the difference is 2.8 percentage points, 
it declines to 1.2 percentage points by 2007. For transfer income the revenue share increases 
by 0.3 percentage points. In contrast, the revenue shares of both capital income and loss de-
duction decrease considerably from alternative 2 to alternative 3. For capital income this ef-
fect is dominated by the heavy losses from renting and leasing during the last decades. Even 
for alternative 2 the PIT shares of total capital income are negative in the years 1995 and 
1998. The decline of losses from renting and leasing leads to a positive share of this income 
type in the following years under alternative 2 but remains slightly negative under alternative 
3. The PIT share of total capital income is positive in 2003 and 2007 for both alternatives 2 
and 3. 
5.2  Implicit Tax Rates 
Our Tables 2 to 5 highlight the impact of the PIT apportionment scheme for the macroeco-
nomic implicit tax rates on income sources, which are regarded as summary measures for the 
income tax burdens by economic functions. We adopt the approach developed by the Euro-
pean Commission (2009), as outlined above (section 4.2). For that purpose, the tax revenue 
assigned to the respective income types is divided by the corresponding income aggregates, 
derived from the national accounts statistics. According to the approach of the European 
Commission, implicit tax rates are calculated for labor income (Table 2), and for capital and 
business income (Table 3), the latter differentiated by corporations (Table 4) and households 
including self-employed (Table 5).  
The upper panel of the Tables 2 to 5 shows the results for the implicit income tax rates by the 
three apportionment schemes. The next panel displays the entire implicit tax rates where other 
relevant taxes such as social contributions or other taxes on business income are also taken 
into account. These results could be best compared with the Commission’s results on implicit 
tax rates for Germany. Deviations from our results stem from the differing data bases (as-
sessment data from the tax statistics versus revenue statistics) and from some adjustments in 
the denominator of the implicit tax rate on capital and business income (see section 4.2). The 
underlying aggregates on income sources and tax burden are reported in the lower panel of the 
Tables 2 to 5.  24
Implicit tax rates on labor income 
In calculating the implicit tax rate on labor income, the European Commission puts the tax 
revenue in relation to the compensation of resident employees according to national accounts 
(for the precise definition see above, section 4.2). The tax revenue from labor income includes 
both the wage share in PIT liability and the actual social contributions on labor income. Ac-
cording to our results the implicit tax rate rises until 1998 and declines afterwards (Table 2). 
The latter should reflect the reform agenda of the first red-green federal government after 
1998, which markedly reduced social contribution rates. These reliefs were financed by 
spending cuts in social security and indirect tax hikes (VAT, eco taxes). In the following 
years the step-by-step income tax reform reduced income tax rates until the year 2005. Our 
results with respect to level and trend of the implicit tax rates on labor income are very close 
to those obtained by the European Commission (2009: 325) in most years, the remaining dif-
ferences are due to the fact that the Commission’s calculations are based on cash revenue of 
PIT. 
What is interesting here is the share of PIT including solidarity surcharge that is affected by 
the apportionment scheme. Compared with alternative 1 which allocates the income tax only 
by positive income sources, alternative 2 yields an increase in implicit tax rates by 0.4 per-
centage points in 1995. Alternative 3 involves a rise of 0.8 percentages points in that year. 
The downturn of losses from renting and leasing lowers these differences until 2007 to 0.2 
percentage points for alternative 2, and 0.4 percentage points for alternative 3 respectively. 
These differences seem not to be too substantial at first glance. In view of the huge aggregate 
of labor income amounting to Euro 1,200 billion, however, these differences deal with a tax 
revenue of Euro 3 to 5 billion in 2007. This equates to the revenue of the German inheritance 
and gift tax, which has been under heavy discussion for many years.  25
Table 2 
Implicit tax rates on labor income according to different apportionment schemes for PIT revenue, 
1992–2007 
1992 1995 1998 2003 2007
1)
Implicit tax rates on labor income
2)
Personal income tax and solidarity surcharge on labor income, 
allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources   12.2   12.7   13.5   13.3   13.2 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources   12.5   13.0   13.9   13.6   13.5 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment   13.5   14.4   14.0   13.7 
Actual social contributions on labor income
3)   24.8   26.4   27.6   26.9   26.0 
Total,                                                                                              
allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources   37.1   39.1   41.1   40.2   39.2 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources   37.3   39.4   41.5   40.5   39.5 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment   39.9   42.0   40.8   39.7 
For information:
Tax revenue and income aggregates
Personal income tax and solidarity surcharge on labor income, 
allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources   112.0   126.3   139.5   151.0   156.8 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources   114.4   129.9   143.6   154.5   159.4 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment   134.4   148.7   158.2   162.1 
Actual social contributions on labor income
3)   227.9   263.1   284.8   304.0   307.7 
Compensation of employees (resident), national accounts   917.2    997.0   1032.3   1132.1   1183.6 
bill. Euro
%
1) Estimation.- 2) Based on the compensation of employees (resident), national accounts. This includes the employers' 
social contributions.- 3) Paid by employers and employees.
Sources: Personal income tax statistics, 10 % or 1 % stratified random samples of the respective years; microsimulation 
models of DIW Berlin and FIT Sankt Augustin; Federal Statistical Office Germany (Destatis). 
 
Implicit tax rates on capital and business income 
Moreover, the European Commission calculates implicit tax rates on capital and business 
income. Table 3 assembles all taxes on business and capital income which are divided by the 
corresponding income aggregates. For the denominator we basically rely on the income con-
cept of the Commission based on national accounts, but adjust for the local business tax 
which is deducted from business income and correct for tax-exempted subsidies and central 
reserve bank profit (see above, section 4.2). For the numerator we include the PIT share and 
the other taxes on business and capital income, such as the local business tax, the corporate 
income tax, the capital returns tax non-credited to domestic personal or corporate income tax, 
and the social contributions levied on the income of the self-employed.   26
Table 3 
Implicit tax rates on capital and business income  
according to different apportionment schemes for PIT revenue, 1992–2007 
1992 1995 1998 2003 2007
1)
Implicit tax rates on capital and business income
2)
Personal income tax and solidarity surcharge on capital and 
business income, allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources  9.1   7.1   8.7   7.4   8.3 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources  8.5   6.3   7.9   6.7   7.9 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment  5.3   6.8   6.0   7.5 
Social contributions of the self-employed, local business tax, 
corporate income tax, non-credited capital returns tax, solidarity 
surcharge
3)  12.8   11.6   13.1   11.4   11.6 
Total,                                                                                              
allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources  21.9   18.7   21.8   18.7   19.8 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources  21.3   17.9   21.0   18.1   19.5 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment  16.8   19.9   17.3   19.1 
For information:
Tax revenue and income aggregates
Personal income tax and solidarity surcharge on capital and 
business income, allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources  37.4   33.4   45.1   41.3   62.3 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources  34.9   29.8   40.9   37.7   59.6 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment  24.8   35.3   33.4   56.7 
Other taxes on capital and business income, and social 
contributions of the self-employed
3)
Local business tax  22.5   20.7   24.5   24.5   40.7 
Corporate income tax
4)  18.3   17.9   26.4   23.3   28.3 
Non-credited capital returns tax
5)  1.8   3.8   4.0   4.3   6.4 
Solidarity surcharge  0.8   1.6   1.7   1.5   1.9 
Social contributions of the self-employed  8.9   10.5   10.9   10.2   9.8 
Total  52.3   54.5   67.6   63.8   87.1 
Capital and business income, national accounts
concept of the European Commission  398.9   460.5   503.3   545.5   721.6 
own concept
6)  409.4   470.7   517.6   560.4   753.0 
bill. Euro
%
1) Estimation.- 2) Based on business and capital income derived from national accounts, own concept.- 3) Data from tax 
statistics, estimations for 2003 and 2007; social contributions according to national accounts.- 4) Assessed corporate 
income tax less credited corporate income tax (full imputation scheme until 2001).- 5) Estimation.- 6) Business and capital 
income derived from national accounts according to the concept of the European Commission, plus deducted local 
business tax, less profit of the central reserve bank, less 20 percent of recieved subsidies.
Sources: Personal income tax statistics, 10 % or 1 % stratified random samples of the respective years; corporate income 
tax statistics; local business tax statistics; microsimulation models of DIW Berlin and FIT Sankt Augustin; Federal Statistical 
Office Germany (Destatis).
 
For the PIT share on business and capital income we sum up the shares falling on the self-
employed income, on income from capital investment, on renting and leasing, and on de-
ducted losses from other tax years (see the respective items in Table 1). The last are almost 
completely caused by unclaimed losses from to self-employed and capital income, since 
losses do not play any significant role in labor and transfer income (see the discussion in sec- 27
tion 4.2). Table 4 and Table 5 present the breakdown of the implicit tax rate on capital and 
business income to corporations and house-holds including self-employed.  
Generally, the results presented here show relatively low implicit tax rates on capital and 
business income, compared to statutory tax rates or even effective tax rates estimated from 
„forward-looking“ simulation models for Germany (see Spengel, 2003, Becker and Fuest, 
2006, Devereux et al., 2008). This reflects the remarkable shortfall of taxable business income 
reported in the tax statistics, compared to the corresponding income aggregates of national 
accounts (see Bach and Dwenger, 2007, Heckemeyer and Spengel, 2008). The same is true 
for capital income of households, which is also caused by the saver’s allowance for income 
from capital investments, and, presumably, considerable tax evasion.9 
The implicit tax rates on capital and business income markedly declined since 1992. In 1995, 
the massive investment incentives for Eastern Germany provided by generous tax allowances 
might have impaired the tax burden, besides small tax cuts in the previous years. In 1998, the 
implicit tax rate turns out somewhat higher which might be explained by the upturn of the 
business cycle. By 2003, the tax cuts from the preceding business tax reform came into effect. 
The years until 2007 show considerably rising implicit tax rates due to the boost in business 
income. 
Because of the much smaller share of capital and business income in comparison with labor 
income, the impact of the PIT apportionment scheme on the implicit tax rates is significantly 
stronger than for labor income. The 1995 implicit tax rate using alternative 2 decreases by 0.8 
percentage points compared to alternative 1, for alternative 3 the impact of the PIT allocation 
makes up 1.8 percentage points. Until 2007, these differences fall to 0.4 percentage points for 
alternative 2, and to 0.7 percentage points for alternative 3 respectively. 
The comprehensive utilization of tax statistics data allows us, for the first time for Germany, 
to differentiate the implicit tax rate on capital and business income into those of corporations 
and households including the self-employed according to national accounts sectors. The re-
port of the European Commission (2009) does not provide these figures for Germany since 
                                                 
9   In order to illustrate the possible effect of an overestimation of capital and business income in national ac-
counts on our results for the respective implicit tax rate, we calculated the implicit tax rates for alternative 2 
assuming a capital and business income aggregate decreased by an amount equal to 1 percent of GDP. In this 
case, the level of the implicit tax rate shown in Table 3 for alternative 2 increases by less than 1 percentage 
point in all years observed.  28
the revenue statistics used in that study do not allow an apportionment to these subgroups of 
taxpayers with respect to non-incorporated partnerships (see above, section 4.2).10 
Table 4 presents the results for the implicit tax rates for corporate business income, including 
the business and income tax share of partnerships. There is a considerable decrease in implicit 
tax rates over the period observed, in particular since the business tax reform 2001. Until 
2007, the implicit tax rates might have decreased further according to our estimated tax reve-
nue. Although the tax revenue of both PIT and the other business income taxes rises consid-
erably again, the macroeconomic tax base increases even stronger. In 1995, the implicit tax 
rate for alternative 2 increases by 0.4 percentage points compared to alternative 1, for alterna-
tive 3 by 0.7 percentage points. These differences reduce to 0.2 percentage points both for 
alternative 2 and 3 until 2007. 
The implicit tax rates on capital and business income for the household sector including the 
self-employed are dominated by the PIT burden (Table 5) since the social contributions of the 
self-employed and the other taxes on business and capital income are low. The apportionment 
schemes have a strong impact on implicit tax rates, in particular when losses from renting and 
leasing peaked around the years 1995 and 1998. For these years the results report a reduction 
of the implicit tax rate for alternative 2 by 1.1 percentage points in comparison to alternative 
1, and by 2.5 percentage points for alternative 3 (2.6 percentage points in 1998). In particular 
due to the decline of losses from renting and leasing the implicit tax rates almost recapture the 
1992 level by 2007. The differences in the implicit tax rates decrease to 0.7 percentage points 
(alternatives 2 versus 1) and 1.2 percentage points (alternatives 3 versus 1). 
 
                                                 
10   It should be noted that the capital and business income aggregates assigned to the two sectors do not sum up 
to the overall aggregate, as explained in footnote 8. Thus, the overall implicit tax rate on capital and business 
income is not equal to the weighted average of the sectors’ implicit tax rates.  29
Table 4 
Implicit tax rates on capital and business income of corporations including partnerships 
according to different apportionment schemes for PIT revenue, 1992–2007 
1992 1995 1998 2003 2007
1)
Implicit tax rates on capital and business income
2)
Personal income tax and solidarity surcharge on capital and 
business income, allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources  6.1   5.3   6.4   3.8   3.9 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources  6.3   5.7   6.7   3.9   4.2 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment  6.0   7.0   3.9   4.2 
Local business tax, corporate income tax, non-credited capital 
returns tax, solidarity surcharge
3)  21.4   17.6   18.9   15.2   14.5 
Total,                                                                                              
allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources  27.5   22.9   25.3   18.9   18.4 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources  27.7   23.2   25.6   19.0   18.7 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment  23.6   25.8   19.0   18.7 
For information:
Tax revenue and income aggregates
Personal income tax and solidarity surcharge on capital and 
business income, allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources  11.0   11.7   17.4   11.7   18.6 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources  11.4   12.5   18.0   12.0   19.7 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment  13.3   18.8   12.0   19.8 
Other taxes on capital and business income
3)
Local business tax  19.1   18.6   22.4   21.7   37.2 
Corporate income tax
4)  18.3   17.9   26.4   23.3   28.3 
Non-credited capital returns tax
5)  0.4   0.8   0.8   0.9   1.3 
Solidarity surcharge  0.7   1.4   1.5   1.3   1.6 
Total  38.5   38.6   51.1   47.1   68.5 
Capital and business income, national accounts
concept of the European Commission  170.0   210.2   256.7   296.7   443.2 
own concept
6)  180.3   220.2   270.4   310.8   472.9 
bill. Euro
%
1) Estimation.- 2) Based on business and capital income derived from national accounts, own concept.- 3) Data from tax 
statistics, estimations for 2003 and 2007.- 4) Assessed corporate income tax less credited corporate income tax (full 
imputation scheme until 2001).- 5) Estimation.- 6) Business and capital income of corporations derived from national 
accounts according to the concept of the European Commission, plus deducted local business tax, less profit of the central 
reserve bank, less 20 percent of recieved subsidies.
Sources: Personal income tax statistics, 10 % or 1 % stratified random samples of the respective years; corporate income 





Implicit tax rates on capital and business income of households and self-employed 
according to different apportionment schemes for PIT revenue, 1992–2007 
1992 1995 1998 2003 2007
1)
Implicit tax rates on capital and business income
2)
Personal income tax and solidarity surcharge on capital and 
business income, allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources  7.5   5.4   6.4   6.1   7.5 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources  6.6   4.3   5.3   5.3   6.9 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment  2.8   3.8   4.4   6.4 
Social contributions of the self-employed, local business tax,   
non-credited capital returns tax, solidarity surcharge
3)  3.9   3.9   3.8   3.4   3.2 
Total,                                                                                              
allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources  11.4   9.3   10.2   9.6   10.8 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources  10.6   8.2   9.0   8.7   10.1 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment  6.7   7.6   7.9   9.6 
For information:
Tax revenue and income aggregates
Personal income tax and solidarity surcharge on capital and 
business income, allocated by 
Alternative 1: Allocation across positive income sources  26.4   21.8   27.7   29.6   43.7 
Alternative 2: Allocation across all income sources  23.5   17.3   22.9   25.7   39.8 
Alternative 3: Allocation with separate assessment  11.5   16.5   21.4   36.9 
Other taxes on capital and business income, and social 
contributions of the self-employed
3)
Local business tax  3.4   2.1   2.2   2.8   3.4 
Non-credited capital returns tax
4)  1.5   3.1   3.2   3.5   5.2 
Solidarity surcharge  0.1   0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3 
Social contributions of the self-employed  8.9   10.5   10.9   10.2   9.8 
Total  13.8   15.9   16.5   16.6   18.7 
Capital and business income, national accounts
concept of the European Commission  353.1   405.2   434.3   482.9   577.7 
own concept
5)  353.3   405.4   434.9   483.7   579.3 
bill. Euro
%
1) Estimation.- 2) Based on business and capital income derived from national accounts, own concept.- 3) Data from tax 
statistics, estimations for 2003 and 2007; social contributions according to national accounts.- 4) Estimation.- 
5) Business and capital income of households and self-employed derived from national accounts according to the concept of 
the European Commission, plus deducted local business tax, less 20 percent of recieved subsidies.
Sources: Personal income tax statistics, 10 % or 1 % stratified random samples of the respective years; local business tax 
statistics; microsimulation models of DIW Berlin and FIT Sankt Augustin; Federal Statistical Office Germany (Destatis).
 
6  Conclusions 
Summary measures on the tax burden by economic functions have a considerable influence 
on tax policy debates. They comprehend essential characteristics of the tax system and allow 
for comparisons over time or across countries. However, summarizing the vast complexity of 
the tax system to one or a few parameters always implies a loss of information. The effective-
ness and significance of such parameters depends on their construction, and on the data base 
from which they are derived.  31
Macroeconomic implicit tax rates are important parameters for the description and evaluation 
of the tax burden by economic functions. This is particular true for the taxation of main in-
come sources such as labor income, capital and business income, or transfer income. For that 
purpose, the tax revenue assigned to these income types is divided by the corresponding in-
come aggregates, usually derived from the national accounts statistics (European Commis-
sion, 2009). This calculation is not straightforward, however, in the case of a “comprehen-
sive” personal income tax (PIT). Real-world PIT systems aggregate several income catego-
ries, allow for loss-offset across income types, grant deductions of several personal allow-
ances, and tax the residuum at progressive tax rates. Therefore, one has to implement an ap-
portionment scheme for PIT which depends on the aim of the analysis. This raises the ques-
tion of how far the estimated tax burden of one income source depends on the choice of the 
apportionment system. In particular, losses that are allowed to set off against positive income 
in a tax year or over time may have a marked impact on the tax share of income sources as 
well as on implicit tax rates. 
In this study, we examine three alternative apportionment schemes for allocating the personal 
income tax by income sources. The analysis demonstrates the impact of the alternatives on the 
tax shares and the implicit tax rate of income sources. The first apportionment scheme allo-
cates total PIT liability across the positive income sources according to their share in total 
positive income. Losses from particular income sources are neglected in this case. A second 
apportionment scheme, which is used by the European Commission (2009), distributes the tax 
burden according to an income source’s share in total income, both positive and negative. 
Hence, the PIT share equals the income amount times the average tax rate. This apportion-
ment scheme accounts for negative income shares of losses which are set off against current 
positive income. However, this only applies if total income is positive and thus a tax liability 
comes due. We propose a third apportionment alternative which comprehensively accounts 
for loss offset. In addition to the apportionment alternative 2 we account for losses even if the 
taxpayer’s total income is negative but at least one income source is positive. For that pur-
pose, we run a separate assessment for total positive income and assign the difference be-
tween the fictitious PIT liability for the positive incomes and the actual PIT liability to the 
loss income types as a negative revenue share. With a direct progressive tax rate function, as 
it applies in Germany and most of the OECD countries, the negative revenue share of losses 
turns out to be higher than for alternative 2. This is also the case for losses which are com-
pletely offset against current positive income. Approximately, losses are valued with the aver- 32
age tax under alternative 2, and with the marginal tax rate under alternative 3. Losses carried 
forward and carried back are also taken into account applying the alternatives 2 and 3. 
We analyze the impact of the alternative schemes using representative micro data from the 
available years of the tax statistics over the period of 1992 to 2003. Moreover, we point out 
the impact on macroeconomic implicit tax rates which we calculate following the approach of 
the European Commission (2009). Besides the personal income tax we include social contri-
butions and the other taxes on business income (local business tax, corporate income tax). The 
use of micro data from tax statistics instead of macro data from revenue statistics or national 
accounts allows us, for the first time for Germany, to allocate the overall tax burden on busi-
ness income to private households (including the sole proprietors) and corporations (including 
partnerships) according to the concept of national accounts.  
We find that the choice of the apportionment scheme markedly affects the tax share of the 
income sources. Alternative 1 involves higher income tax shares and implicit tax rates for 
income types that are running losses. Only tax liabilities on positive income count for the tax 
share although the tax base for calculating implicit tax rates is reduced by losses. Therefore, 
this apportionment scheme is not well suited for the calculation of implicit tax rates. Our cal-
culations show noticeable differences in the results of alternatives 1 and 2 for capital income, 
in particular for income from renting and leasing, since losses from these incomes have been 
dominating during the last decades in Germany. Interpreting the macroeconomic implicit tax 
rate as tax burden of the “average individual”, one might better rely on alternative 2 which is 
also used by the European Commission (2009).  
Alternative 3 puts more weight on losses, compared to alternative 2. This results in lower 
shares of capital and business income in total income tax burden, in particular due to the high 
losses from renting and leasing. This impact accounts for more than one percentage point 
during the nineties. For capital and business income of households including the self-
employed this difference makes up 1.5 percent at that time, since losses from renting are con-
centrated at the household sector. Due to the decline of losses from renting these differences 
decrease considerably until the last years. Correspondingly, income sources without signifi-
cant losses such as labor income or transfer incomes move in the opposite direction. They 
show higher tax shares and implicit tax rates. Thus, the apportionment alternative 3 provides 
significant information if single income sources run losses to a larger extend and over longer 
periods, as it was the case for income from renting in Germany over the last decades.  33
Appendix 
Table A-1 
Business and capital income in the personal income tax statistics, 1983–2004 
Income source 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004
 Income from
 agriculture and forestry  4.3   4.6   5.8   6.1   6.4   7.7   7.4   7.0   6.8   7.2 
    positive income  4.5   4.8   6.1   6.7   6.9   8.2   7.9   7.6   7.4   7.7 
    negative income - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.3  - 0.5  - 0.5  - 0.5  - 0.5  - 0.6  - 0.6  - 0.5 
 business enterprise  44.6   50.6   67.2   67.3   62.0   86.7   70.7   71.6   71.8   78.4 
    positive income  46.1   52.4   73.2   78.4   77.2    103.8   88.9   87.7   85.1   90.8 
    negative income - 1.5  - 1.8  - 6.0  - 11.1  - 15.2  - 17.1  - 18.2  - 16.0  - 13.3  - 12.4 
 self-employed activities  18.3    20.7   24.9   35.3   40.0   48.6   51.8   53.4   52.4   55.5 
    positive income  18.4   20.9   25.4   36.1   40.9   49.7   52.9   54.6   53.6   56.6 
    negative income - 0.2  - 0.2  - 0.5  - 0.7  - 1.0  - 1.1  - 1.1  - 1.1  - 1.2  - 1.1 
  capital  investment   9.9   12.8   16.1   28.6   18.3   22.7   32.3   19.7   17.0   16.7 
    positive income  9.9   12.9   16.4   28.8   18.6   23.0   32.8   20.2   17.4   17.0 
    negative income - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.3  - 0.3  - 0.3  - 0.5  - 0.4  - 0.4  - 0.4 
 renting and leasing
1) - 9.8  - 10.5  - 5.0  - 9.3  - 18.6  - 16.5  - 3.4  - 1.4   0.9   5.2 
    positive income  7.1   8.4   10.0   12.9   15.7   19.3   20.6   21.6   21.9   23.0 
    negative income - 16.9  - 18.9  - 15.1  - 22.2  - 34.3  - 35.8  - 24.0  - 23.0  - 21.0  - 17.8 
 Total income  67.2   78.3   108.9   128.0   108.1   149.2   158.7   150.4   148.9   163.0 
    positive income  86.0   99.5   131.1   162.9   159.4   204.0   203.1   191.6   185.4   195.2 
    negative income - 18.8  - 21.2  - 22.1  - 34.8  - 51.3  - 54.8  - 44.4  - 41.2  - 36.6  - 32.2 
 For information:
  Total  income   7.7   7.8   9.3   7.8   5.8   7.6   7.5   7.0   6.9   7.4 
    positive income  9.9   9.8   11.2   9.9   8.6   10.4   9.6   8.9   8.6   8.8 
    negative income - 2.2  - 2.1  - 1.9  - 2.1  - 2.8  - 2.8  - 2.1  - 1.9  - 1.7  - 1.5 
as percent of GDP
in billion Euro
1) 1983 and 1986: less imputed rental value from owner-occupied dwellings (estimated).
Sources: Federal Statistical Office Germany (Destatis).; own calculations.
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Illustration of the apportionment alternatives 2 and 3 for the personal income tax 
In a simple example, we consider two types of income (y1, y2). The progressive tax function 
(T) is assumed to be given by: T = 0.001 * (y1+y2)
2. 
For a constant level of income type 2 (equal to 50), Figure 1 shows the share (in absolute 
terms) of the income tax which falls on income type 1, depending on the level of y1 in a range 
between -70 und +50. First, it can be easily seen, that the share of the income tax falling on 
income type 1 is the same in both alternatives if the value of y1 is positive (and therefore, the 
values of both types of income in the example are positive).  
Figure A-1 
































If the values for income type 1 start to be negative, both alternatives assign a strictly negative 
tax share to income type 1 at first. The value of this share is higher in alternative 3 compared 
to alternative 2. In alternative 2, the amount is equal to average tax rate calculated at (-y1+y2) 
times y1. In the case of a loss of just one unit for y1, the tax share assigned to income type 1 
in alternative 2 is equal to the average tax rate (calculated at (-y1+y2)). In alternative 3, the 
tax share assigned to income type 1 for negative values of y1 is defined as the difference of 
the tax calculated at y2 and the tax calculated at (-y1+y2). For (negative) values of y1 which 
are close to zero, the tax amount assigned to income type 1 is nearly equal to the marginal tax 
rate calculated at y2=50, with a negative sign. For the progressive tax function assumed, this  35
marginal tax rate is obviously higher than the respective average tax rate applied in alternative 
2.11 
In case that the loss for income type 1 exceeds the positive income of type 2, the tax assigned 
to income type 1 remains negative in alternative 3. The amount is equal to the tax due to the 
positive income of income type 2 (y2=50), however, with the opposite sign. 
 
 
                                                 
11   For a linear tax function, for example T=0.1 (y1+y2), the results of alternatives 2 and 3 would be equal also 
for negative values of y1 as long as the sum of both values remains positive. Consider, for example, the val-
ues y1=-1, y2 =50, y1+y2=49. For these, the tax assigned to income type 1 according to alternative 2 is equal 
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